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A Petition for Extraordinary Relief is the Appropriate Procedure under the 
Facts of this Case. 
Fanners argues that, based on the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, 299 P.3d 1058, Intermountain cannot 
demonstrate that its entitled to have its petition for extraordinary relief granted. That is 
incorrect. Indeed, Lindberg actually supports lntermountain' s position. In that case, the 
court held that whether to grant a petition for extraordinary relief is within the sound 
discretion of the appellate court. Some factors that the court considers in determining 
whether to grant such a petition are "the egregiousness of the alleged error, the significance 
of the legal issue presented by the petition, the severity of the consequences occasioned by 
the alleged error, and additional factors." Id, ,I 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). None 
of these factors are dispositive or limit the court's discretion. Id. 
In Lindberg, the court concluded that the petitioner had "appropriately utilized a 
petition for extraordinary writ [to] challenge[] the district court's order" because, as a 
nonparty to the litigation, the petitioner had "no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy to 
challenge the district court's order." Id, ,I 23 (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). 
Moreover, the court found that the district court's order that required disgorgement of 
privileged information could result in irreparable injury to the petitioner because, once 
released, an appellate court cannot always un-ring the bell and repair the harm occasioned 
by the dissemination of that information. 
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In this case, just as in Lindberg, Intermountain is a nonparty. Therefore, it has no 
other means to challenge the District Court's order. Moreover, this is not the first time that 
Intermountain has been subject to a similar discovery request from Farmers or someone 
similar to Farmers. However, this is the first time that a court has allowed such broad 
discovery into Intermountain' s pricing formula. Much of the information sought constitutes 
trade secrets. Additionally, the Order seeks to have Intermountain disclose this information 
to the in-house counsel of one oflntermountain's adversaries in the marketplace. Once this 
information is disclosed, the bell cannot be un-rung and the proprietary nature of the 
information is put at risk for future inadvertent disclosure and use by Farmers in other 
litigation. See discussion infra. Additionally, Intermountain is subject to the burden of 
repeatedly having to produce the same or similar information and analyze the same or 
similar issues regarding Rule 26 in other litigation. The questions presented by the petition 
are therefore subject to reputation but evasion of review. There is minimal case law 
regarding the interpretation of Rule 26' s proportionality standard under the new discovery 
rules adopted in 2011. A petition for extraordinary relief is an appropriate procedure to both 
challenge the District Court's order interpreting and applying this rule and request further 
guidance on the same. 1 This Court, therefore, should exercise its discretion and review 
whether Intermountain is entitled to the relief that it requests. 
1 Indeed, Farmers admitted to the District Court that "until there's some established 
precedence perhaps by the Utah Supreme Court or whatever, that these Intermountain 
bills are not admissible evidence, we're going to go through this fight and we are going to 
have different judges that are going to view this differently." (See Opp., Addendum 1, 
pp., 24-25 ln 25-4.) 
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II. The Information Farmers Seeks is Irrelevant and Disproportional to the 
Needs of the Personal Injury Action. 
Intermountain' s opening brief argued that the District Court abused its discretion 
when it failed to properly analyze under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) whether the 
discovery sought by Farmers is relevant to any claim or defense and proportional to the 
needs of the case. In response, Farmers does not dispute the test set forth by Rule 26. 
Instead, Farmers makes two arguments. First, it alleges that the District Court correctly 
applied Rule 26(b) when it held that information regarding Intermountain' s pricing 
formula and business model is relevant and proportional "to determine if [Intermountain] 
is a collateral source." (Opp. p., 21.) Second, it argues that information regarding 
Intermountain's relationship with doctor Kade T. Huntsman is relevant and proportional 
to determine whether this relationship "limits his objectivity as an expert witness for the 
[Plaintiffs]." (Id.) Neither of these arguments has merit. 2 
2 Farmers contends that discovery issues will not be overturned unless there is no 
evidentiary basis for a district court's decision. That argument misstates Intermountain's 
position. Intermountain is not simply arguing that there is no evidentiary basis for the 
District Court's decision. Rather, it is arguing that the District Court did not correctly 
apply Utah R. Civ. P. 26. (See lntermountain Br., 14-24.) As acknowledged by Farmers, 
as well as the cases cited by Farmers, whether a district court correctly applied the rules 
of civil procedure is reviewed for correctness. (See Opp., pp. 6, 23 ( citing Williams v. 
Anderson, 2017 UT App 91, ,I 13, 400 P.3d 1071 (holding that a district court's 
interpretation of Utah R. Civil Procedure is reviewed for correctness and reversing when 
district court misapplied that rule); see also Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 
1997) (reversing district court for failure to properly analyze the relevance and 
proportionality of a discovery request under Utah R. Civ. P. 26). 
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A. Discovery regarding whether Intermountain is a collateral source is 
not relevant or proportional under U tab Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) 
given the facts in this case. 
1. Whether Intermountain is a collateral source is not relevant to 
any determination to be made in this case. 
Farmers does not dispute that under Rule 26(b ), the court should have analyzed the 
test for determining future medical expenses under Utah law and then analyzed whether 
the information sought was relevant to the determination of that issue. Farmers also does 
not dispute that, under Utah law, the reasonable value of a plaintiffs medical expenses 
are determined by the price that those services sell for in the marketplace in the relevant 
community. Additionally, Farmers does not dispute that patients who receive medical 
services at one of Intermountain' s surgical suites are billed for those services in the same 
manner that other facility providers bill for their services, i.e., the services are billed by 
reference to CPT codes. 
Despite these apparent concessions, Farmers claims that information regarding 
Intermountain' s pricing formula and business model is relevant because Plaintiffs "persist 
in presenting the [Intermountain] estimates as medical bills" and therefore it is "necessary 
to expose the estimate for what it really is, namely what [Intermountain] would charge to 
finance the surgeries for the [Plaintiffs] in exchange for a lien in their lawsuit." (Opp., 
25.) Farmers, therefore, claims that the District Court correctly determined that the 
evidence sought is "clearly relevant" to "determine whether [the estimate] is inadmissible 
evidence of collateral source or admissible evidence of future anticipated medical 
expenses." (Id.) There are several problems with this argument. 
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First, this argument is based on an incorrect presumption that there is allegedly 
some confusion regarding whether Intermountain is acting as a collateral source or 
medical service provider in this case. There is no dispute that Intermountain is not acting 
as either in this case. Intermountain does not have a lien in this case and has not agreed 
to provide any services (medical or collateral) to the Plaintiffs. 
Nor could the estimate constitute a collateral source. A collateral source is an 
independent source that has or will compensate a plaintiff for or in part for a specific loss. 
Wilson v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2012 UT 43, 1 31, 289 P.3d 369; Mahana v. Onyx 
Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, ,r 37, 96 P.3d 893. Thus, under the collateral source rule, 
a plaintiff is entitled seek full recovery from a tortfeasor even though an independent 
source has compensated the plaintiff in full or in part for the loss. The rationale for the 
rule is two-fold: "First, public policy favors giving the plaintiff a double recovery rather 
than allowing a wrongdoer to enjoy reduced liability simply because the plaintiff received 
compensation from an independent source." Second, by assuring "a plaintiffs payment 
from a collateral source will not be reduced by a subsequent judgment," the "rule 
encourages the maintenance of insurance." Id., 1 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In this case, there is no dispute that the estimate is not an agreement between 
Intermountain and Plaintiffs to compensate Plaintiffs for any past or future losses. 
Moreover, even in cases where there exists such an agreement between Intermountain 
and a plaintiff, Farmers does not dispute that the agreement is not for compensation of 
medical bills and is not akin to insurance. Rather, a plaintiff who obtains a surgery in 
Intermountain' s medical suite remains liable to pay the full amount for the medical 
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services billed by Intermountain. (Intermountain Br., p. 8.) Therefore, unlike collateral 
source evidence, a plaintiff who obtains a surgery at an Intermountain surgical suite is not 
faced with the possibility of gaining a double recovery. Farmers' continued argument 
regarding the relevancy of determining whether Intermountain is a collateral source or a 
medical service provider is not at issue in this case, and the District Court erred in 
holding otherwise. 
Second, even if there was some confusion regarding whether the estimate 
constitutes a collateral source, Farmers provides no analysis or argument how this 
information is in any way relevant to determining the reasonable value and necessity of 
Plaintiffs' future surgeries. The estimate is an approximation of what Intermountain 
charges for the Plaintiffs to obtain a specific surgery at Intermountain' s surgical suite. 
Although unclear, it appears that Farmers' main concern is that the charges are high 
compared to that in the community, and therefore, according to Farmers, the price must 
reflect the risk associated with lntermountain's business practice of allowing its clients to 
defer payment of their bill until the completion of their lawsuit. 
But this argument assumes that, under Utah law, a company's profit margins and 
risk assessment is relevant to the determination of the reasonable value of a plaintiffs 
medical services. That is not the correct starting point under Rule 26. Rather, the correct 
starting point is the determination of how the reasonable value of medical services is 
determined under Utah law. Then the court is required to analyze how the information 
sought is relevant to that determination. If the test for determining the reasonable value 
of a plaintiffs medical expenses was costs plus reasonable profit margin, then Farmers' 
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argument might have some merit. However, as already explained in Intermountain's 
opening brief and not disputed by Farmers, the reasonable value of a plaintiffs medical 
expenses is determined by examining the prices that those services sell for in the 
community. A needless excursion into determining a company's profit margins and how 
that company sets its profit margins does not answer that question.3 Rather, the question 
is answered by comparing the prices charged for similar surgical services in the 
marketplace. Likewise, a needless discussion of whether a plaintiff can pay for his 
medical expenses, whether a service provider can take a lien out on a judgment, or when 
a plaintiffs payment on his medical bills is due is an independent determination 
irrelevant to the question of the reasonable value of a plaintiffs medical expenses. 
Wilson v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2012 UT 43, ,r 38 ("How a plaintiff satisfies his medical 
expense obligations presents a separate issue that is irrelevant to the calculation of his 
damages.") 
Farmers complains that, under Utah law, medical bills are often admitted into 
evidence to prove the reasonable value of a plaintiffs medical expenses with minimum 
foundation. (Opp., p. 22). That argument lacks merit. An estimate is not a medical bill. 
Moreover, a medical bill is not even admissible unless a plaintiff can demonstrate that the 
bill represents the reasonable value of the medical services in the marketplace. 
3 Presumably other facility providers' prices include some risk assessment, especially as 
pertains to clients who do not have insurance. See, e.g., Howell v. Hamilton Meats & 
Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1145 (Cal. 2011) (noting that the price for medical 
services for people who have insurance and the price for medical services for people who 
do not have insurance is different). 
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Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 11 35-36 and n.8, 17 P.3d 1110 (collecting cases). 
Therefore, it is not the medical bill that establishes the reasonable value of the services. 
Moreover, Farmers' continued inference throughout its brief that the estimate is 
the equivalent to a "medical bill" is perplexing and obfuscates the issue in this case. (See 
Opp., pp. 2, 22, 25, 26 (referring to the estimate as a medical bill).) The manner for 
proving whether a bill constitutes the reasonable value of medical services in the 
community is inherently different than that for an estimate. For medical bills, a plaintiff 
can prove that the bill represents the reasonable value for services by virtue of assuming 
liability for its payment. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 1 31-32, 
977 P.2d 508; Gorostieta, 2000 UT 99, 1 35 n.8. The rationale being that a plaintiff 
would not have paid or otherwise become liable for the bill if the price did not represent a 
reasonable market price. See id. The same does not hold true for an estimate for which a 
plaintiff never becomes liable. 
Farmers also speculates that the estimate may come in through expert testimony. 
There are only two experts identified by Plaintiffs who could provide such testimony-
Intermountain and Dr. Huntsman. Intermountain has already stated multiple times that it 
is not providing any expert opinions and is not qualified to provide expert testimony in 
this case. The only other expert identified as potentially proving the reasonable value of 
the medical services stated that his opinion as relates to this issue is based on his 
experience in the industry in general, not on any particular documents or bills. 
Q: All right. So to come up with this amount, you didn't go pull particular bills; 
this is just something that you had off the top of your head; am I following 
correct? 
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A: Yes. With some experience. 
Q: Well, I understand that. But I mean, if we wanted to see the source of this, I 
can't go have you pull the same bills that you used; these are just numbers that you 
kind of came up with over time; is that right? 
A: Yes. 
(Huntsman Depa., p. 40; see also Opp., p. 13 (quoting the same).) 
In other words, the estimate itself does not and cannot prove the reasonable value 
of Plaintiffs' medical expenses. Indeed, more likely than not, the document will not even 
be admitted into evidence. Farmers should not be given access to Intermountain' s 
proprietary pricing information or be forced to go through the burden of submitting 
30(b)(6) testimony and documents so that Farmers can allegedly prove a non-issue. 
Intermountain is not a collateral source in this case, and its estimate does not and cannot 
prove the reasonable value of medical services in the community. 
Farmers argues in a footnote that the information it seeks (the first three topics that 
Judge Hansen ordered to be produced) is relevant to the determination of whether 
Intermountain is a "health care facility" as that term is referred to under Utah Code § 26-
21-2. (Opp., p. 8, n. 13.) Farmers offer no argument or analysis why this is relevant or 
proportional to the determination of the reasonable value of Plaintiffs' medical expenses. 
Intermountain has already given Farmers this information in other litigation. 
lntermountain does not have licenses or accreditations to operate an ambulatory surgical 
facility. The relevant licenses and accreditations are held by Canyon Crest Surgical. 
Intermountain leases a surgical suite from Canyon Crest Surgical and supplies that suite 
with all of the equipment, supplies, etc. to perform the necessary surgeries. 
Intermountain then charges the patient for his/her use of the surgical suite and supplies. 
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The charges to the patient, including those for facilities and supplies, are done just like 
any other medical bill by reference to CPT code. (lntermountain Br., 7.) The bill that 
Intermountain sends its clients are what it charges for a particular medical procedure to 
be performed in its medical suite. If these prices are allegedly not reflective of the 
marketplace price, like any other litigation, Farmers can support its defense by reference 
to relevant information (i.e., the prices charged in the community for the medical 
procedure in question). Intermountain's profit margins or its risk assessment in 
determining what it charges for the use of its suite and equipment are irrelevant to the 
determination of the reasonable value of the medical services provided.4 
2. The determination of whether Intermountain is a collateral 
source is not proportional to the needs of this case. 
To determine whether the discovery requested by Farmers is proportional, the 
District Court was required to analyze ( 1) the importance and need for the information 
compared to (2) the burden imposed on Intermountain. Farmers argues that the District 
Court did not err in this analysis because "medical bills carry more weight than an 
academic evaluation of market place economics and that is why it is relevant and 
proportional to subject [Intermountain] to discovery for purposes of proving that the 
surgical cost estimate is not a medical bill." (Opp., p. 26.) Farmers also suggests that 
4 Farmers also suggests that Intermountain does not have a license from the American 
Medical Association to use copyrighted CPT codes in its bills, and therefore, Farmers 
intends to ask questions regarding Intermountain's license to use such codes in its 
30(b)(6) deposition. Notably, Farmers never sought discovery on this issue, and 
therefore, the District Court did not order discovery on this issue. See Order passim. In 
any event, Intermountain has not provided any medical services to the Plaintiffs and there 
is no bill or use of CPT codes in this case. 
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such discovery is not burdensome because "[Intermountain] cannot show severe adverse 
consequences to its business" when a protective order that '"amounts to an 'attorney eyes 
only' restriction [] prohibits the disclosure of the information to anyone other than the 
attorneys representing the parties and limits the use of the information to this case only." 
(Opp., pp., 24-25). None of these arguments has merit. 
First, as relates to Farmers' alleged important need to "prove[] that the surgical 
cost estimate is not a medical bill," this argument has already been addressed above. 
There is no dispute that the estimate is not a medical bill. Farmers' continued arguments 
as relates to the estimate allegedly constituting a medical bill is a red herring, and the 
District Court erred in relying on it. 
Second, as regards to Farmers' arguments regarding the burden imposed on 
Intermountain, Farmers misstates the requirement of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26 
and 45. Nowhere in those rules does it state that information is discoverable unless the 
party subject to the discovery request or subpoena request demonstrates "a severe adverse 
consequence to its business." See Utah R. Civ. P. 26 & 45. Rather, Rule 26 states that a 
discovery request is proportional if: 
(b )(2)(A) the discovery is reasonable, considering the needs of the 
case, the amount in controversy, the complexity of the case, the parties' 
resources, the importance of the issues, and the importance of the discovery 
in resolving the issues; 
(b )(2)(B) the likely benefits of the proposed discovery outweigh the 
burden or expense; 
(b )(2)(C) the discovery is consistent with the overall case 
management and will further the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of the case; 
(b )(2)(D) the discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or 
duplicative; 
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(b )(2)(E) the information cannot be obtained from another source 
that is more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive; and 
(b )(2)(F) the party seeking discovery has not had sufficient 
opportunity to obtain the information by discovery or otherwise, taking into 
account the parties' relative access to the information. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b )(2). 
The theme underlying all of these factors is that discovery is considered 
proportional if the moving party demonstrates that there is a legitimate need for the 
information to prove an important issue and that similar information cannot be obtained 
from another source. Moreover, in relation to Rule 45, the court "may order compliance 
with a subpoena request" only "if the party or attorney responsible for issuing the 
subpoena shows a substantial need for the information that cannot be met without undue 
hardship." Utah R. Civ. P. 45(e)(5). Thus, contrary to Farmers' position, it was Farmers' 
burden, not Intermountain's, to prove that its subpoena request is proportional and that it 
could not, without undue hardship, obtain similar information from another source. 
Farmers' argument regarding a protective order being in place also ignores other 
burdens associated with its subpoena request. These burdens include, among other 
things, pulling the requested information for this particular case, marking the confidential 
information, hiring an attorney to attend the deposition, paying an employee and attorney 
to attend the deposition, and diverting resources from its business operations. 
Additionally, Intermountain is being subject to similar burdens over and over again in 
relation to other litigation in which Farmers, or entities similar to Farmers, are involved. 
Moreover, the fact that the information is designated as protected does not alleviate 
lntermountain' s concerns that its proprietary information may inadvertently find its way 
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into the public domain. As already stated in Intermountain's opening brief, Farmers' in-
house counsel has already attempted to use information that was protected by an 
"attorney eyes only" designation for purposes of performing discovery. (lntermountain, 
Br., 25.) 
For this reason, other courts have held that an "attorney's eyes only" designation is 
not sufficient protection when there is risk that counsel may inadvertently disclose or use 
confidential information in other litigation. See, e.g., United States v. Aetna, Inc., No. 
1:16-cv-01494, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191730, *18-26, 2016 WL 8738420 (collecting 
cases and holding that in-house counsel should not have access to confidential 
information regarding costs negotiated by medical providers because counsel was often 
involved in other litigation in which he may inadvertently disclose the confidential 
information provided). 
That Intermountain has had to produce some proprietary information in other 
cases likewise does not mean that this request is not burdensome. Indeed, as Farmers 
itself admits, each case is different so the cost information provided in association with 
another plaintiffs medical procedures does not equate to the same cost information 
associated with the surgical procedures quoted to the Plaintiffs in this case. See Opp., p. 
24; see, e.g., Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997) (holding that costs for other 
people's injuries is not relevant to determine the costs associated with a particular 
plaintiff's medical procedure). Moreover, the discovery into the cost information in this 
case is extraordinarily broad. See Order. Additionally, each time that Intermountain has 
to disclose information to Farmers, or any other entity like Farmers, it is risking that its 
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information will inadvertently be disclosed in the public domain and lose its proprietary 
nature. Farmers conceded below and to this Court that it has other means to defend 
against the reasonableness and necessity of Plaintiffs' medical expenses. It therefore 
does not have a substantial need to discover Intermountain' s proprietary business 
information to determine the reasonable value and necessity of Plaintiffs' future 
surgeries. The District Court erred in holding otherwise. 
B. The information sought is not relevant or proportional to determining 
whether Dr. Huntsman is allegedly biased. 
Farmers asserts that the District Court correctly determined that information 
regarding "the contractual and financial relationship between [Intermountain] and Dr. 
Huntsman is relevant to whether Dr. Huntsman is conflicted and biased as an expert." It 
is unclear what specific subpoena requests Farmers is referring to as being relevant to this 
determination. The only subpoena requests relating to Dr. Huntsman are as follows: 
4. The number of surgeries Dr. Huntsman performed in 2016 for which 
he or his business entity was paid by Intermountain Surgical LLC; 
5. 
(Order, p. 4.) 
The total fees [Intermountain] paid Dr. Huntsman performed in 2016 
for which he or his business entity was paid by Intermountain 
Surgical, LLC. 
Although unclear, Farmers appears to argue that, without this information, it will 
be unable to prove that Dr. Huntsman has a financial incentive to provide a favorable 
causation opinion to lntermountain clients who are generally plaintiffs. But why is this 
relevant? As already described above, Intermountain does not have a contract to provide 
any surgical services to the Plaintiffs and does not have a lien in this case. It is therefore 
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unclear how the number of surgeries performed by Dr. Huntsman for Intermountain or 
Intermountain' s relationship with Dr. Huntsman could be relevant. It is not even clear 
why Intermountain' s name would be mentioned at all in this litigation. 
Moreover, even if his financial relationship with Intermountain was somehow 
relevant, it is not proportional. Farmers can demonstrate Dr. Huntsman's alleged biased 
causation opinions by other means. Specifically, just as it does with any other expert, 
Farmers could ask Dr. Huntsman the number of favorable consults he gives in plaintifrs 
cases. It could also ask Dr. Huntsman the fees associated with such consults. 
Additionally, although not relevant, nothing precludes Farmers from asking Dr. 
Huntsman what his financial relationship is with Intermountain. Indeed, Farmers already 
admits that it has done so in this case and that its discovery request merely "adds 
certainty to the numbers Dr. Huntsman estimated." {Opp., p. 19.) There is no substantial 
need to have Intermountain reiterate what Farmers has already learned from Dr. 
Huntsman, and the District Court erred. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant Intermountain's petition for 
extraordinary relief, reverse the decision of the District Court, and direct the District 
Court to issue a protective order prohibiting Farmers from seeking additional information 
from Intermountain. 
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DATED this 27th day of November, 2017. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Karra J. Porter 
Scott T. Evans 
Kristen C. Kiburtz 
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